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Tässä  tutkimuksessa  käytetään  faktorianalyysiä  useiden  makrotalouden  indikaattoreiden 
sisältämän informaation tiivistämiseen siten, että saadut faktorit voidaan tulkita Kiinan ta-
louden tilaa kuvaavina suhdanneindikaattoreina. Tutkimuksessa verrataan estimoitujen fak-
toreiden ja BKT:n dynamiikkaa sekä mallin tuottamia faktoreita muihin, jo olemassa ole-
viin  Kiinan  talouden  suhdanneindikaattoreihin.  Tuotetun  indikaattorin  ja  Kiinan  BKT-
sarjan liikkeet vastaavat varsin hyvin toisiaan, ja sarjojen erot ovat vähäisiä. Silloin kun 
näiden sarjojen välillä esiintyy eroja, ne näyttävät johtuvan Kiinan talouskasvuun kohdis-
tuvista šokeista, sillä sen paremmin BKT:n autoregressiivinen prosessi kuin suhdanneindi-
kaattoritkaan eivät onnistu ennustamaan talouden kasvua näillä periodeilla.  
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Abstract
We use factor analysis to summarize information from various macro-
economic indicators, eﬀectively producing coincident indicators for the
C h i n e s ee c o n o m y . W ec o m p a r et h ed y n a m i c so ft h ee s t i m a t e df a c t o r s
with GDP, and compare our factors with other published indicators for
the Chinese economy. The indicator data match the GDP dynamics well
and discrepancies are very short. The periods of discrepancies seem to
correspond to shocks aﬀecting the growth process as neither autoregres-
sive models for GDP itself nor various coincident indicators are able to
forecast them satisfactorily.
Keywords: Factor models, principal component, GDP, China.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C38, O4, P2.
∗We thank Carsten Holz, Ali Kutan, Henri Nyberg, participants in the 2011 AEA-ASSA
Meetings in Denver, ACES session on Perspectives on China’s Growth, the 2011 Finnish
Economic Association Annual Meeting in Oulu, and a Bank of Finland seminar, for their
helpful comments and suggestions. All views expressed in the paper are personal and do not
necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Finland or the Government Institute for Economic
Research. Any errors are our own.
†Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), PO Box 160, FI-00101
H e l s i n k i ,F I N L A N D .e - m a i la a r o n . m e h r o t r a @ b o f . ﬁ.
‡Government Institute for Economic Research, PO Box 1279, FI-00101 Helsinki, FIN-
L A N D .e - m a i lj e n n i . p a a k k o n e n @ v a t t . ﬁ.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
China’s growing role in the world economy has prompted international observers
and researchers to develop leading and coincident indicators for analyzing the
current dynamics and prospects of the Asian powerhouse. The OECD, for
example, has published a leading indicator for China since 2006. In May 2010,
the US Conference Board released both a coincident and a leading indicator for
China, providing backdata until 1986. Indeed, assessment of China’s growth has
become so critical that the simple announcement by the Conference Board in
July 2010 that it was revising its April 2010 calculation for its leading indicator
was enough to put international ﬁnancial markets on edge.
At the same time, research has been conducted pointing to plausible limita-
tions with Chinese data. This arises despite the fact that many of the concerns
expressed are relevant for many emerging economies, and the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS) in China is aware of shortcomings with the data. Zheng
(2001) notes that the quarterly national accounts rely heavily on estimates and
excessive aggregation, and are particularly weak with respect to the transporta-
tion and real estate sectors and the price system. Xu (2004, 2008) elaborates
on China’s statistical practices and describes the discrepancies with GDP mea-
surements between China’s practice and the 1993 SNA guideline (although such
discrepancies do not impact estimation of the size of GDP). He (2010) also re-
ports discrepancies in China’s GDP accounting, attributing them mainly to the
revision methodology used after the 2004 census.
International observers have challenged the Chinese data from several per-
spectives (IMF, 2006).1 The World Bank (1997) claimed growth may have been
about one percentage point lower than oﬃcial ﬁgures state during 1978-1995
due to underestimation of consumption and investment deﬂators.2 Some au-
1In 2010, the overall score for China’s data in the World Bank Statistical Capacity Indicator
(SCI) was 58 on a scale 0-100, somewhat below the international average (65). The World
Bank Statistical Capacity Indicator (SCI) consists of three assessment areas: methodology
(where China’s score is 50), data sources (score 40), and periodicity and timeliness (score 83).
See World Bank (2011).
2Young (2003) suggests that systematic understatement of inﬂation by enterprises accounts
for 2.5% growth per year in the nonagricultural economy during the ﬁrst two decades of the
reform period (1978—98). Henderson et al. (2009) compare the oﬃcial output growth to
1thors question the credibility of Chinese statistics (e.g. Rawski, 2001), while
others point out discrepancies between provincial and national GDP ﬁgures.
Holz (2008) presents the view that the economic census results of 2004 actu-
ally provide evidence in favor of the provincial numbers against the national
aggregates.
This paper combines the interest in building coincident indicators to evaluate
China’s growth with an examination of how well they match the data on GDP.
We use factor analysis to summarize information from various macroeconomic
indicators, eﬀectively producing a subset of coincident indicators for the Chinese
economy. We compare the dynamics of the estimated factors with GDP, and
compare our factors with other published indicators for the Chinese economy.
The results suggest that our indicator data, summarized by principal compo-
nents, closely match the GDP dynamics and that the discrepancies between
GDP data and components are small. Moreover, the dynamics of our indicator
are extremely close to those published by the US Conference Board and China’s
NBS (especially since 2001). The periods of discrepancies between GDP data
and the coincident indicators seem to correspond to shocks aﬀecting the growth
process, as neither autoregressive models for GDP itself nor various coincident
indicators are able to forecast GDP growth at these periods satisfactorily.
The contribution of the study is that our paper brings previously suggested
episodes of statistical inconsistencies into an empirical test by means of factor
analysis.3 This diﬀers from previous papers that have established alternative
GDP series for China by means of growth accounting, or have pointed out data
discrepancies without using econometric techniques to evaluate their exact tim-
ing or extent. Moreover, we are unaware of any other study that compares
published coincident indicators for China with the aim of analyzing how well
these capture the dynamics of the reported GDP. This is important; the dif-
ferent published indicators on China’s development now attract considerable
public attention, yet their relationship with China’s GDP ﬁgures has not been
that suggested by satellite data on lights at night during the period 1992/1993 — 2005/2006.
According to their results, the adjusted growth rate for China is somewhere between 7.0-9.0%
p.a.
3There are a few studies that use principal component analysis in tracking the state of the
economy (see e.g. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2001; Giannone et al., 2008).
2evaluated. The beneﬁt of our approach is that the relative importance of the
diﬀerent factors can be examined and the factors can be given an economic
interpretation, advancing the understanding of the drivers of growth in China.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology
of the study, and includes a discussion about the relevant data issues. This is
followed by Section 3 presenting the estimation results. Section 4 closes the
paper.
2M e t h o d o l o g y
We compare various indicators of growth with the oﬃcially reported GDP data.
Using static factor analysis, we combine information from numerous production
indicators by a principal components approach, and regress the reported GDP
growth ﬁgures on the estimated factors.4 The estimated factors provide a proxy
for the dynamics of growth, which could be treated as a type of latent variable
(see e.g. Aigner et al., 1984). By analyzing the ﬁt of the model across time,
we can detect periods when the reported growth ﬁgures are at odds with our
indicators.
Since a complete coverage of economic production is hard to achieve even
in advanced economies, the OECD (2002) attempted to provide a standard on
measurement for the non-observed economy (NOE).5 The principles for measur-
ing the NOE are quite general and useful in selecting the indicators of economic
activity. However, observed deviances between our measure of economic activ-
ity and China’s GDP may stem from the fact that our measure better captures
the non-observed economy not present in oﬃcial statistics. A similar index is
used by the Chicago Fed to measure “real-time” economic activity in the US
providing support to our approach (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2001).6
4See Stock and Watson (2002), who construct forecasts by principal components from a
large number of predictors. They show that as the number of predictors and time-series
observations grow large, the forecasts are asymptotically eﬃcient and consistent.
5According to the OECD, non-observed activities are those missing from the basic data used
to compile the national accounts because they are underground, illegal, informal, household
production for own ﬁn a lu s e ,o rd u et od e ﬁciencies in the basic data collection system.
6The Chicago Fed National Activity Index is the ﬁrst principal component comprising 85
variables representing four categories of the US data: i) production and income; ii) employ-
3Given the data at hand, our approach is best described as a mixture of the
production approach and income-based methods, although some demand-side
data are used as control variables (OECD Handbook, Ch. 5). The production
approach attempts to measure the industry-speciﬁc production from agriculture,
construction, trade etc. using indicators such as fertilizers, cement and import
statistics. Income-based methods use information on household income such
as disposable income or net income. The exact variables used to estimate the
static factor are speciﬁed in Appendix (A). There are 83 variables in total.7
In selecting the exact variables to be included in the factor model, we beneﬁt
from the analysis by Rawski (2001), who highlighted numerous inconsistencies
between standard data during the slowdown of 1997-2000. We bring several of
these suggested inconsistencies into a statistical test. We include indicators of
energy production, noting Rawski’s observation that while reported real GDP
grew by close to 25% during 1997-2000, energy consumption dropped by almost
13%.8 Similarly, the inclusion of the production ﬁgures of numerous industrial
products is justiﬁed by the persistently large share of industry in China’s GDP
(roughly 50%) and the fact that the trends in production of these goods are
sometimes at odds with aggregate industrial production ﬁgures. Among the
industrial products, we include steel and cement. Again, Rawski makes the claim
that the high reported growth in investment during 1997/1998 is inconsistent
with the weaker growth in steel consumption and cement output.
In order to capture demand-side pressures, we include consumer price inﬂa-
tion, imports from Asia, and cargo at ports.9 Income developments are taken
into account by including the growth of disposable income per capita in the ur-
ban areas, together with the cash income per capita of rural households. Rawski
ment, unemployment and hours; iii) personal consumption and housing; and iv) sales orders
and inventories. It seems to track the US business cycle surprisingly closely.
7The results by Bai and Ng (2002) suggest that the number of variables to construct the
factor need not be extremely large for the principal components approach to yield precise
estimates. Thus, the number of indicator variables in our analysis could be even smaller.
However, we include all the available variables that could give reasonable information about
the growth dynamics.
8The reason for using energy production, instead of consumption, is data availability.
9Imports from Asia and cargo handled at ports are included in the OECD Composite Lead-
ing Indicator for China. Our empirical analysis suggests that these data provide meaningful
information to evaluate the coincident dynamics in China as well.
4(2001) suggests that aggregate retail sales ﬁgures are at odds with household
income ﬁgures as higher retail sales imply an increasing propensity to consume.
In fact, the savings rate of Chinese households has been increasing over time.
Income developments are also partly reﬂected in the measures of service (trans-
portation) sector we employ such as the overall number of tourists and passen-
gers on highways, waterways, railways, and in aviation. We also include proﬁts
of industrial enterprises as an indicator of overall proﬁtability of the economy.
Principal component analysis aims at reducing the dimensionality of a dataset
consisting of a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much
of the variation present in the dataset as possible (Jolliﬀe, 2002). The principal
components methodology applies the variance structure of the indicator vari-
ables and represents a solution method for a factor model. The presentation of
the model here closely follows Johnson and Wichern (2002).
Consider an observable (×1) random vector ,w i t hm e a n and covariance
matrix Σ. According to a general factor model,  is linearly dependent on
unobservable random variables 1 2, also called the common factors,
and on  additional sources of variation, (1 2),t h es p e c i ﬁcf a c t o r s .A n
orthogonal factor model can be written in matrix notation as  =  + + 
Here the matrix  is a ( × ) matrix of factor loadings, with its components
 representing the loading of the ith variable on the jth factor. The idea is
to capture the most variation in  with the principal components  = .
Principal components (PCs) are ordered so that the ﬁrst component retains
the highest share of variation in the dataset compared to the other indicators.
Ideally, the PCs have meaningful interpretations, but only in the limits of the
accompanying economic theory or the context of a particular application.
To obtain the principal components solution, let us consider the sample
correlation matrix  speciﬁed in terms of its spectral decomposition. Let  be





Assume that the normalized eigenvectors are the columns of another matrix




 = Λ0 with 0 =
0 =  and Λ is a diagonal matrix with 1 2 on the diagonal. We
specify the sample correlation matrix  in terms of its eigenvalue-eigenvector
pairs (b 1b 1)(b 2b 2)(b b ),w h e r eb 1 ≥ b 2 ≥  ≥ b .I f  ≺  is the

















As we want to combine information from a relatively large number of indi-
cators into a small number of factors, we are interested in the share of sample
variance contributed by the various factors. The proportion of the total sam-




b b )=b .
While there is no consensus over how to choose the PCs for a regression analy-
sis, it is obvious the PCs should retain enough of the variation of the original
data. In our case, the question is simpliﬁed by our underlying aim to capture
the dynamics of GDP. However, since the data are noisy and some indicators
are perhaps poorly measured, some PCs with a high variance could, in fact, be
poor explanatory variables of the underlying “latent” variable — GDP growth.
Since we do not know a priori which variables are measured well, we include all
the original 83 variables in our dataset to compute the principal components.
Therefore, it is plausible that some of the ﬁrst PCs are not closely related to
actual GDP growth as they may capture noise or the underground economy,
while some PCs with a low variance may have high explanatory power.10
After the principal components are determined, estimating a principal com-
ponent regression is straightforward. A standard regression model is  = +
where  represents China’s GDP growth rate,  corresponds to the vector of in-
dependent explanatory variables,  is the vector of regression coeﬃcients and 
represent the i.i.d. errors — deterministic components are omitted for simplicity.
We then use our estimated principal components as the explanatory variables
in the  vector.
3 Empirical evidence
Due to data availability limitations and the signiﬁcant reforms that China un-
derwent in early 1990s, our estimation sample spans 1997Q1 to 2009Q4.11 This
time period captures two episodes of challenging international crises for Chi-
10For more discussion see Jolliﬀe (2002), Chapter 8.
11According to Holz (2003), the World Bank accepted the oﬃcial Chinese GDP data for
its own publications in 1999. However, to include the Asian crisis, we begin our sample in
1997Q1.
6nese policymakers: the Asian and the global crisis. Prior to the start of the
sample period, China experienced overheating with inﬂation surging alongside
demand pressures in 1993-1994. Thereafter, China’s policymakers applied strin-
gent macroeconomic policies that brought inﬂation back under control. China
even experienced deﬂationary episodes in 1998-2000 and 2002. Some observers
attribute the period of deﬂation to productivity increases and tariﬀ cuts due
to WTO membership (see IMF, 2003), but weak demand is likely to have con-
tributed as well, given that the regional environment experienced a negative
shock due to the Asian crisis in 1997-1998. Strong growth ensued in 2003, and
the government used contractionary macroeconomic policy at that time. Never-
theless, economic overheating became a serious concern for oﬃcials in 2006. The
global ﬁnancial crisis hit China’s economy through the collapse in international
trade in late 2008, but growth rates remained relatively high in international
comparison. The lowest year-on-year growth rate (6.2%) was recorded in the
ﬁrst quarter of 2009. A large ﬁscal stimulus package announced in late 2008 was
instrumental in maintaining economic growth; its impact was seen most directly
in infrastructure investment.
It is necessary to obtain stationary data to apply the principal components
analysis. For this purpose, all non-negative series were transformed into log-
arithms. Year-on-year growth rates of the resulting series were next taken to
be consistent with our dependent variable, the reported (year-on-year) GDP
growth rate.12
The estimated ﬁrst principal component, applying the sample correlation
matrix, from our data sample explains 22% of total sample variance, while 8%
is explained by the second component. We depict the ﬁrst principal component
in Figure 1, together with the dependent variable, the y-o-y growth in GDP.
There appears to be a rather strong comovement between the two series. With
the ten ﬁrst principal components we are able to explain just under 70% of the
total sample variance, as shown in Table 1.
12The oﬃcial consumer price inﬂation series is already reported in year-on-year terms.
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First principal component (left scale)
GDP growth, y-o-y (right scale)
Figure 1. First principal component and GDP growth
As a starting point for our analysis, we regress the reported GDP growth rate
on the ten ﬁrst principal components, a constant and a linear trend, applying
an OLS estimation (Model 1 in Table 2).13 We then sequentially eliminate all
13Boivin and Ng (2006) ﬁnd that the importance of the various factors depends on the exact
macroeconomic time series to be explained; for some macro variables the estimated factors
beyond the ﬁrst three are quite important.
8regressors with the lowest -values, at each step re-estimating the model, until
all coeﬃcients satisfy the 10% signiﬁcance threshold. In the resulting Model
2 in Table 2, only the components 1, 4 and 7 maintain their statistical
signiﬁcance, together with the constant term and a linear trend. What is the
composition of these three components in terms of the factor loadings?
The ﬁrst principal component has high factor loadings on industrial indica-
tors, speciﬁcally electricity production and production indicators for individual
industrial goods. As the industrial sector corresponds to 50% of China’s GDP
from the production side, the close relationship between this component and
G D Pg r o w t hd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1i sn o ts urprising. The fourth principal com-
ponent has signiﬁcant loadings on passenger numbers, i.e. indicators closely
linked to the service sector, while the interpretation of the seventh component
is somewhat less clear. However, given that the highest factor loadings are on
household incomes, both rural and urban, and on some consumption goods such
as garments, ventilators and coke, the latter used in heating and cooking, the
seventh component could represent household income and consumption.14 If the
three principal components are interpreted as industrial production, service sec-
tor and household consumption/income, respectively, our model suggests these
are the drivers of growth in China.
Given the possibility that some of the indicator series may be associated
with GDP with a lag, we also consider a model including the ﬁrst lags of the
principal components 1, 4 and 7 in the regression. However, a standard
Wald test does not reject a hypothesis that all the ﬁrst lags can be set jointly
to zero (-value 0.70).15 We therefore continue with Model (2) of Table 2 as the
benchmark. The residuals from this regression are depicted in Figure 2.16
14While coke is also used for electricity production, our interpretation here builds on the
fact that each PC adds new information to the previous ones and the PCs are orthogonal.
Since electricity production ranked high in the ﬁrst component, the new information present
in coke is probably more related to household than industry use. Also inﬂation, which aﬀects
household savings, has a high loading in the seventh component.
15The ﬁt of the regression could be considerably improved by including a lagged dependent
variable. However, this would run counter to the aim of using indicator variables to proxy
growth dynamics in the economy.
16A standard ADF test on the residuals of Model 2 provides strong evidence that the
residuals are stationary.






































Adj. R-squared 0.556 0.550
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Figure 2. Residuals from benchmark regression
While for most of the sample the ﬁt of the regression is perhaps surprisingly
10good, there are some periods with more signiﬁcant discrepancies. The signiﬁcant
residuals appear during the Asian crisis, the period 2001-2003, the overheating of
the economy in 2007 and the global crisis in end-2008. Rawski (2001) suggested
that the slowdown in the late 1990s was more severe than reported in the GDP
data. Our results similarly show discrepancies between the estimated factors
and GDP data in 1998 during the Asian crisis.17 For most of the late 1990s
and through to early 2001, however, the estimated factor indicates no major
discrepancies. Our results obtain some support from Chow (2006), who does
not think it plausible that GDP growth rates in 1999-2001 would have been
extremely low and yet increase dramatically in the following years. In contrast,
when the GDP growth rate was in the range of 12%-14% in 2007, our analysis
claims that this dynamic is not in line with the estimated factors. A similar
ﬁnding is obtained for the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, when the global ﬁnancial crisis
impacted China mainly through a decline in international trade.
An obvious check to evaluate the robustness of the above ﬁn d i n g si st o
regress the announced GDP growth rates on another set of indicators. The
Conference Board in 2010 started to publish both a coincident and leading in-
dicator for China, providing backdata all the way to 1988.18 The Coincident
Economic Index is comprised of value added of industrial production, retail sales
of consumer goods, electricity production, volume of passenger traﬃc and man-
ufacturing employment. Similarly, the NBS reports a coincident index among
its three macro-economic climate indices, providing data back to 1991. The
coincident index is reported to “reﬂect the basic trend in the economy,” and it
is calculated using the following four data: industrial production, employment,
investment, consumption and foreign trade, and social income, the latter in-
cluding government tax revenue, enterprise proﬁts and the income of residents
(see e.g. NBS, 2010). We regress the announced GDP growth rate on the coin-
cident indicators separately (together with a constant and trend) and compare
17Holz (2003) notes that there may have been substantial revisions to the NBS’s energy
data in 1997/1998. A re-estimation of the model starting from 1998 does not bring about
statistically signiﬁcant changes in the estimated parameters, however.
18When the Conference Board’s coincident indicator was ﬁrst published, the Economist
(2010) noted that since China’s economic present is almost as unclear as its future, the coin-
cident indicator is of interest. This is, of course, the rationale for our factor analysis.
11the residuals from these regressions with those using the estimated factor (our
benchmark model). The residuals from these regressions are shown in Figure 3
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Residuals, benchmark model
Residuals, NBS indicator
Figure 3. Residuals from benchmark model, together with regressions with
Conference Board’s coincident indicator (above) and NBS’s coincident index
(below)
12Interestingly, the residuals are largely in line with our model, especially from
2002 onwards.19 There are various possible explanations for this, not all mutu-
ally exclusive. It can be that both of the coincident indicators, and our estimated
factors, are missing some important component of GDP, leading to the observed
residuals. The output of the service sector is the most obvious candidate, al-
though both our factors and the NBS’s coincident indicator include corporate
enterprise proﬁts and residents’ income that could partly reﬂect China’s service
sector developments. Another explanation is that there could be measurement
errors or other quality problems with the GDP data as the residuals from the
regressions are largely in line with another. However, we should emphasize that
the number of outliers among the residuals is actually rather small, and for most
of the sample the dynamics of the coincident indices are in line with the GDP
data. Holz (2004) argues on the basis of Keidel’s (2001) comparison of China’s
production and expenditure side GDP ﬁgures that China’s real GDP data are
not likely to be systematically biased, and are, in fact, rather reliable. One
could read the outcome of our factor analysis as supporting this argument.
As the dynamics of the estimated residuals vary prior to 2002, we evaluate
the performance of the coincident indicators in capturing the GDP dynamics
from the start of the sample through 2001. When we estimate the regression
models during the sample 1997Q1-2001Q4, we ﬁnd that our ﬁrst estimated prin-
cipal component maintains its statistical signiﬁcance during the period. While
the NBS coincident indicator is also statistically signiﬁcant, the Conference
Board indicator is not. This suggests that our ﬁrst estimated factor has impor-
tant explanatory value during the earlier part of the sample, when the dynamics
between the diﬀerent indicators vary. Given that the fourth component had high
factor loadings on indicators related to the service sector and the seventh may
represent the incomes and consumption of the household sector, the insigniﬁ-
cance of the fourth and seventh components in the shorter sample could reﬂect
structural changes, including those in the growth model, of the Chinese economy
over time.20 We have also constructed a vector autoregressive model, speciﬁed
19In Appendix C, we also graphically compare the residuals from the Conference Board’s
model with that of the NBS.
20Similarly, recursive residuals suggest that the signiﬁcance of the fourth and seventh com-
ponents improves in the latter part of the overall sample. This could suggest that industrial
13with four lags, with the variables included in Model (2) of Table 2. Analyzing
the variance decomposition from this system, the importance of shocks to 1
in driving GDP growth is consistently higher than those of 4 or 7,d e s p i t e
diﬀerent tested variable orderings. This provides some further evidence about
the importance of the ﬁrst principal component.21
We next look deeper into the observed residuals for the entire sample. We
take two time periods of large discrepancies, one with a negative (at 2001Q4)
and one with a positive sign (2007Q1), and do a simple forecasting exercise
around those time periods.22 In particular, we wish to evaluate whether it is
possible to obtain accurate forecasts around the time of the outliers by using
(contemporaneous) values of the coincident indicators, or whether a simple au-
toregressive process for GDP growth would be more useful. The structure of
the estimated models is shown in Table 3, and the forecasts from the models








Explanatory variables   (y-o-y)
Dependent variable 
NBS
Explanatory variables  
Dependent variable 
Table 3: Models used for forecasting
production has only gradually led to an increase in household incomes and supported private
consumption and the demand for services in the economy. These results are available from
the authors upon request.
21These results are available from the authors upon request.
22Our approach here is related to “nowcasting,” where monthly data releases are used to
produce current-quarter forecasts of GDP growth (see e.g. Giannone et al., 2008).
14We estimate the models to 2001Q3 and 2006Q4, and evaluate the one-step
ahead forecasts at these time periods, when there was a jump in the residual
series for all of the three models (Benchmark factor model, Conference Board,
and the NBS model). Not surprisingly, neither the benchmark factor models
nor the coincident indices do a good job in forecasting at the times of outliers.
More surprising perhaps is that the AR(1) model using only lagged GDP growth
and the deterministic terms does not forecast well either.23 This suggests that
there could be a structural break in the process around that time, possibly due
to an external shock hitting the economy.
We also look at the forecasts by international experts at these time points,
in particular those published in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF).24 China’s growth prospects were slightly
revised downwards in December 2001 due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the
US, and China’s main trading partners’ prospects were subject to an even bigger
revision. There was a major upward revision during April-September 2007 for
China’s GDP forecast for that year, by a total of 1.5 percentage points. This
suggests that there could indeed be a break in the growth process at that time.
However, as the current values of the coincident indicators also fail to capture
the GDP dynamics in 2001Q4 and 2007Q1, there is a break in the process that
is not explainable by the indicators used in the construction of the coincident
indicators. It is also interesting to note that there was signiﬁcant ex-post revision
of the GDP data for both 2001 (up by 1.0 percentage points) and 2007 (up by
2.3 percentage points), which suggests that there may have been important data
collection problems at that time as well.25
23There is a diﬀerence between the two forecasting periods in that while the actual observa-
tion is inside the 95% conﬁdence intervals for all models in 2001Q4, it is outside the conﬁdence
intervals for all models in 2007Q1. We have also tested for higher order AR processes, but
lags above the ﬁrst one were not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is in line with Galbraith
(2003).
24Pons (2000) analyzes the accuracy of IMF and OECD forecasts for the G7 countries. He
does not ﬁnd evidence of consistent over- or under-estimation in the forecasts.
25The magnitude of the revision is calculated by comparing the reported revised ﬁgures in


































Figure 4. One-step ahead forecasts for 2001Q4 (top) and 2007Q1 (bottom).
4C o n c l u s i o n
The increased economic importance of China has prompted international ob-
servers and researchers to evaluate its economic developments with coincident
16and leading indicators. Indeed, the National Bureau of Statistics in China itself
now publishes both a coincident and leading indicator. Both types of indicators
usually combine a broad range of information from many variables, aggregat-
ing them by statistical techniques. At the same time, some researchers have
expressed concerns about the quality, and even credibility, of China’s GDP sta-
tistics. Then, other indicators for the macroeconomy could be meaningfully
compared with the GDP statistics, in order to bring insight both to the current
and possible future state of the economy.
We combine the previous considerations by aggregating information from
various macroeconomic indicators for China by means of factor analysis, where
we consider a type of coincident indicator and compare the dynamics of the es-
timated factors with the GDP statistics. In particular, we regress GDP growth
rates on the estimated static factors and examine the residuals to ﬁnd out when
the GDP dynamics are possibly at odds with the estimated factors. Our sample
runs from 1997 to 2009, covering both the Asian and the global crisis, with an
episode of fast economic growth, but relatively subdued inﬂation, in between.
We also compare our estimated factors with two other coincident indicators pub-
lished for the Chinese economy, i.e. the ones produced by the US Conference
Board and China’s National Bureau of Statistics. Our factors also provide in-
sights into how the drivers of growth in the Chinese economy may have changed
over time.
We ﬁnd that the dynamics of the GDP data match the estimated factors rel-
atively well, and there are only very short periods (mostly individual quarters)
with discrepancies between the series. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these discrepan-
cies appear at turning points of business cycles, or times of international crises.
Interestingly, the dynamics of the Conference Board’s and the NBS coincident
series are very similar to our estimated factors. Moreover, it is not possible to
obtain reliable forecasts at the times of the discrepancies even with AR forecasts
of the GDP growth rate itself, and there have been forecast revisions by inter-
national observers at these times as well. This suggests that the discrepancies
occur at times of possible structural breaks in the series, and subsequent data
revisions imply that there may have been data collection problems at these time
periods. Nevertheless, we emphasize that during a major part of the sample the
17GDP dynamics match well those of the coincident indicators.
One avenue of future research could be an evaluation of the various leading
indicators for China and how well they forecast the future path of GDP. Such
analyses would be especially relevant in ascertaining possible turning points in
business cycles and would have important implications for economic policymak-
ing.
18AD a t a
Table 4 lists the variables used to estimate the static factor.
19Industrial Production
Air Conditioner Household Refrigerator Steel Products
Alternating Current Generator HH. Washing Machines Sulphur Acid
Autom.: Buses & Coaches Iron Alloy Synthetic Ammonia
Autom.: Cars Kerosene Synthetic Detergents
Autom.: Loading Vehicles Lubricant Oil Synthetic Feed Stuﬀs
Bicycles Metal Cutting Machines Synthetic Rubber
Camera Micro Computer Television Sets: Colour
Canned Food Motor Cycles Total Energy Production
Caustic Soda Oily Gas Ventilator Tractors
Cement Paints Woolen Goods
Chemical Fertilizer Passenger Coaches Woolen Yarn
Cemical Fibre: Artiﬁcial Pharmac. and Medicine Yarn
Chemical Fibre: Synthetic Pig Iron
Civil Steel Ships Plastic Products (PP) Other Series
Cloth: CF, Pure Chemical PP: Membrane for Agric. Cargo Handled at Ports
Cloth: Pure Cotton Power Generated (PG) Enterprise Deposits
Coke PG: Thermal Power Imports from Asia
Color Kinescope PG Equipment Inﬂation
Computer Processed Crude Oil M2
Concentrated Nitric Acid Program Control Switchbr. Number of tourists
Dairy Products Pure Benzene Disposable income per capita,u r b a n
Diesel Oil Rubber Tyre Enterprise proﬁts
Dye Salt Rural cash income
Ethylene Semiconduct. Integr. Circuit Passengers, aviation
Freight Wagons Sewing Machines Passengers, highway
Fuel Oil Silk Passengers, railway
Garments Small Tractors Passengers, waterway
Gasoline Soda Ash
Hi Fi Steel
Table 4: List of variables.

















Table 5: Estimation results for competing models. HAC (Newey-West) standard
errors in parentheses. Trend not displayed.
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Figure. Residuals from regressions with Conference Board’s coincident
indicator and NBS’s coincident index
22References
[1] Aigner, D. J., Hsiao, C., Kapteyn, A., Wansbeek, T., 1984. Latent variable
models in econometrics. In Handbook of Econometrics,V o l u m eI I .E d s .Z .
Griliches and M.D. Intriligator. Elsevier Science Publishers BV.
[2] Bai, J., Ng, S., 2002. Determining the number of factors in approximate
factor models. Econometrica 70(1), 191—221.
[3] Boivin, J., Ng, S., 2006. Are more data always better for factor analysis?
Journal of Econometrics 132, 169-194.
[4] Chow, G., 2006. Are Chinese Oﬃcial Statistics Reliable? CESifo Economic
Studies 52(2), 396-414.
[5] Economist, 2010. Reading China’s palm — A new leading indicator for
China’s economy. May 20th, 2010.
[6] Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2001. Back-
ground on the Chicago Fed National Activity Index.
www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/cfnai/background/cfnai_background.pdf
[7] Galbraith, J.W., 2003. Content horizons for univariate time-series forecasts.
International Journal of Forecasting, 19, 43—55.
[8] Giannone, D., Reichlin, L., Small, D., 2008. Nowcasting: The real-time in-
formation content of macroeconomic data. Journal of Monetary Economics
55, 665—676.
[9] He, X., 2010. Noteworthy Discrepancies in China’s GDP accounting. China
& World Economy 18(4), 88-102.
[10] Henderson, J.V., Storeygard, A., Weil, D.N., 2009. Measuring economic
growth from outer space. NBER Working Paper 15199.
[11] Holz. C. A., 2003. “Fast, Clear and Accurate:” How reliable are Chinese
output and economic growth statistics? The China Quarterly 173,122-163.
[12] Holz, C. A., 2004. China’s statistical system in transition: Challenges,
data problems, and institutional innovations. Review of Income and Wealth
50(3), 381-409.
23[13] Holz, C. A., 2008. China’s 2004 economic census and 2006 benchmark revi-
sion of GDP statistics: More questions than answers? The China Quarterly
193,150-163.
[14] IMF, 2003. Deﬂation: Determinants, risks and policy options — Findings of
an interdepartmental task force. International Monetary Fund, Washington,
DC.
[15] IMF, 2006. People’s Republic of China: 2006 Article IV Consultation–
Staﬀ report; staﬀ statement; and public information notice on the Executive
Board discussion. IMF country report No. 06/394
[16] Johnson, R. A., Wichern, D., 2002. Applied multivariate statistical analysis.
5th edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
[17] Jolliﬀe, I. T., 2002. Principal component analysis. 2nd edition. Springer
series in statistics.
[18] Keidel, A., 2001. China’s GDP expenditure accounts. China Economic Re-
view 12(4), 355-367.
[19] NBS, 2010. China Monthly Economic Indicators, 2010.8. National Bureau
of Statistics: Beijing.
[20] OECD, 2002. Measuring the non-observed economy. A Handbook.O E C D .
[21] Pons, J., 2000. The accuracy of IMF and OECD forecasts for G7 countries.
Journal of Forecasting 19, 53—63.
[22] Rawski, T. G., 2001. What is happening to China’s GDP statistics? China
Economic Review 12, 347—354.
[23] Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W., 2002. Forecasting using principal compo-
nents from a large number of predictors. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 97(460), 1167—1179.
[24] World Bank, 1997. China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Cen-
tury. Washington, DC.
[25] World Bank, 2011. Bulletin Board of Statistical Capacity,
http://go.worldbank.org/6EIB0ZUV00.
24[26] Xu, X., 2004. China’s gross domestic product estimation. China Economic
Review 15, 302—322.
[27] Xu, X., 2008. Some diﬀerences in GDP measurement between China’s prac-
tice and 1993 SNA guideline. China Economic Review 19, 480—488.
[28] Young, A., 2003. Gold into base metals: Productivity growth in the People’s
Republic of China during the reform period. Journal of Political Economy,
111(6), 1220—1261.
[29] Zheng, J., 2001. China’s oﬃcial statistics. Growing with full vitality. China
Economic Review 12, 333—337.
25 
 
 Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 





















No 1  Anatoly Peresetsky: Bank cost efficiency in Kazakhstan and Russia 
No 2  Laurent Weill: Do Islamic banks have greater market power? 
No 3  Zuzana Fungáčová, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill: Market power in the Russian banking industry 
No 4  Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan and Mingming Zhou: The effects of focus versus diversification  
  on bank performance: Evidence from Chinese banks 
No 5  William Pyle and Laura Solanko: The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: A test of 
  Olson’s “encompassing organization” hypothesis  
No 6  Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke and Nicole Glanemann: Off-the-record target zones: Theory with an application 
to   Hong Kong's currency board  
No 7  Vladimir Sokolov: Bi-currency versus single-currency targeting: Lessons from the Russian experience 
No 8  Alexei Karas, William Pyle and Koen Schoors: The effect of deposit insurance on market discipline: 
  Evidence from a natural experiment on deposit flows 
No 9  Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan, Iikka Korhonen, Mingming Zhou: Does diversification increase or decrease 
  bank  risk and performance? Evidence on diversification and the risk-return tradeoff in banking 
No 10  Aaron Mehrotra and José R. Sánchez-Fung: China’s monetary policy and the exchange rate  
No 11  Michael Funke and Hao Yu: The emergence and spatial distribution of Chinese seaport cities 
No 12  Alexey A. Ponomarenko and Sergey A. Vlasov: Russian fiscal policy during the financial crisis 
No 13  Aaron Mehrotra and Alexey A. Ponomarenko: Wealth effects and Russian money demand    
No 14  Asel Isakova: Currency substitution in the economies of Central Asia: How much does it cost? 
No 15  Eric Girardin and Konstantin A. Kholodilin: How helpful are spatial effects in forecasting the growth of 
  Chinese provinces? 
No 16  Christophe J. Godlewski, Zuzana Fungáčová and Laurent Weill: Stock market reaction to debt financing 
  arrangements in Russia 
No 17  Zuzana Fungáčová, Laurent Weill , Mingming Zhou: Bank capital, liquidity creation and deposit insurance  
No 18  Tuuli Koivu: Monetary policy, asset prices and consumption in China 
No 19  Michael Funke and Michael Paetz: What can an open-economy DSGE model tell us about Hong Kong's 
  housing market?  
No 20  Pierre Pessarossi, Christophe J. Godlewski and Laurent Weill: Foreign bank lending and information 
  asymmetries in China 








































Bank of Finland 
BOFIT – Institute for Economies in Transition 
PO Box 160 
FIN-00101 Helsinki 
 
 + 358 10 831 2268 
bofit@bof.fi 
  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 